Why NATO will fail in Afghanistan
Sep. 7th, 2006 09:29 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
chickenfeetFor a while now I've been working on my thoughts about Afghanistan. Much of what I wanted to say was said by Peter Preston writing in the Guardian but ![[livejournal.com profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/external/lj-userinfo.gif)
itchyfidget urged me to go ahead and say what I had to say anyway. So here it is.
In which I argue that NATO's bid to control southern Afghanistan is doomed to failure and that even if military control were to be established it would not result in the outcomes for which NATO is allegedly fighting.
Afghanistan has been invaded umpteen times. The earliest invader I can think of was Alexander the Great (Kandahar anyone). The British at the height of their Imperial power tried it a couple of times, the Soviet Union had a go. Now, NATO. It's not, technically an invasion since (as with the USSR) the 'invaders' are backing the Kabul 'government' but if it walks like a duck...
None of these invaders established a lasting presence for their home governments or their proxies. None of them established a government in Kabul that could actually control the local chiefs who really rule a country of considerable ethnic complexity and horribly difficult terrain. The best that anyone has ever managed is the same solution that the Government of India, before 1948, and Pakistan since have applied in the not dissimilar North West Frontier Provinces; a mixture of (more or less) benign neglect, bribery and terror raids when the locals overstep the mutually understood limits.
In Afghanistan, where British and Canadian soldiers (and of course Afghans) are dying every day, we are told that NATO is promoting democracy and stable government and preventing Afghanistan becoming a failed narcostate. Laudable aims indeed but strategy is not about wishful thinking it's about matching means and ends; achievable ends and available resources. I submit that history and common sense alike argue that extending the control of an unpopular Kabul government over the Pashtun speaking provinces of the south is simply not an achievable aim, even if NATO was prepared to commit the size of force and take the level of casualties that the USSR did, which it isn't.
Look at key features of the situation in, for example Helmand. NATO claims to be fighting the Taleban but the regrettable fact is that they, like previous invaders, are fighting the entire male population of military age.[1] I don't think this implies hard line support for the ideas of the Taleban. It's the natural reaction of a close knit society to invasion. Do you think every Briton in 1940 supported Churchill's union busting? Of course not! Half the population hated his guts but they hated the idea of being conquered by Germany even more. The reaction of the population of the Soviet Union after the German invasion is even more striking. Let's get real. Most people do not like foreign armies telling them what to think and what to do. If they have the means to resist they likely will. If they are armed to the teeth, live in some of the most easily defensible terrain in the world and have a centuries long track record of doing so successfully they are likely to be even more motivated to do so.
The Pashtuns have some other pretty significant advantages. They border on the frontier provinces of Pakistan which, as pointed out above, have never been fully under the control of the government in Simla or in Islamabad. The border is exceedingly porous and allows men and materiel to move back and forth as easily as the terrain allows. In the absence of Pakistani interdiction, the Pashtun can establish rear bases and supply lines beyond reach of the NATO forces. This is hardly a secret as it's exactly how the CIA routed support to the Taleban in earlier days. The security of those LoCs is further reinforced by the politics of the Pakistani military. Pakistan may be a military dictatorship but the one major area of society that Musharraf doesn't really control is the army. The army is riddled with factions and certain crucial parts of it (the Intelligence and Security service for example) are active supporters of the Taleban. Politically, however, the Americans are committed to Musharraf so this (and Pakistani support for terror in Kashmir and elsewhere) must, officially, remain the elephant in the room.
Set against such advantages NATO has only technology. It's other disadvantages are rather substantial. The biggest, of course, is that no NATO power will commit men and money in the quantities necessary to have, literally, a fighting chance. All the NATO powers that are fit to fight (a rather small proportion of the whole) are either overcommitted elsewhere, too small or too sensible[1] to put a serious field force in Afghanistan. Modern armies have surprisingly few actual combat troops[2] and British politicians in particular love to promise troops they don't have for high profile international adventures. As a result, the NATO troops on the ground in Afghanistan are woefully few.
The second crippling disadvantage is that the electorate in the NATO countries are very intolerant of casualties. No Viceroy of India ever had to worry that The Times would run a front page story on the deaths of three infantrymen but that is the problem that NATO governments face today. The front pages of the major Canadian dailies carry "Death in Afghanistan" stories almost every day. Both British and Canadian governments will face the electorate within a maximum of about eighteen months. The public will not support years of the boys coming home in wooden boxes.
That leaves technology. Clearly technology gives NATO a significant advantage but though Strykers and A-10s are a significant step up from AK-47s and RPGs, so were mountain artillery and rockets versus matchlocks, or RAF bombers versus bolt action rifles. Technology allows NATO to minimise casualties and to inflict death and destruction. It won't provide victory because one doesn't win an infantry war until your guys can walk across the ground and flush the other guys out of their hole at bayonet point. Technology can't do that and there aren't (and never will be) enough troops on the ground to do it the old fashioned way.
And what if, by some miracle, the southern tribes decided to stop fighting? Would that permit the development of an autonomous civil society, the rule of law, free and fair elections and the eradication of the opium poppy? It's inconceivable. Look at those parts of Afghanistan where the government's writ more or less runs. They are run in the traditional way. The Karzai government contents itself with skimming off western aid money while appointing bandits loyal to it to governorships and senior security positions. Those bandits operate the same devil's deal with the locals that local strong men always have. In return for deference, tribute and military support when needed they will provide defence from outsiders (including the central government) and rudimentary enforcement of traditional ideas of justice. That's how it's been for centuries. One day it may change but that will be when the Afghans want change not when NATO or some other bunch of foreigners tells them to.
fn1 Interestingly, the Americans when they were fighting in the south largely avoided this mistake. They gave it out for public consumption that they were fighting Al Quaeda and the Taleban but, in practice, left the Taleban alone. Unsurprisingly, in a society where someone from the next valley is considered a foreigner, Al Quaeda's motley band of Arabs, Chechens and Pakistanis garnered a good deal less local support.
fn2 Besides the USA, Britain, France and Germany have relatively large, well trained and equipped armed forces. One or two of the smaller countries like Norway and Canada have small but well trained forces. The rest range from ex Warsaw pact relics through the frankly useless (like the Danes) to the large but dubious Turkish Forces. In practice, Germany does not commit forces to overseas combat missions and France does so only for entirely French reasons.
fn3 The British Army has forty understrength infantry battalions (forty-three if one factors in the RMLI and special forces). When the need to bring a deployed battalion up to strength is factored in, that amounts to no more than thirty five. What politicians are reluctant to recognise (and generals too timid to point out forcefully enough) only about 20% of that force can be deployed for combat missions at any one time. More, and the strain of continued unaccompanied tours, hits reenlistment and recruiting so badly that the force shrinks still further. In other words, the British can deploy maybe seven battalions long term in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. That's 5000 deployable infantry at anyone time. That's barely enough for Iraq. In other words, the troops for Afghanistan are only being made available by exceeding long term sustainable deployment levels which explains why only 700 or so infantry are available for the whole of Helmand province. Realistically the much smaller Canadian army can only add another 1000 or so, despite having no other major commitments. Nobody else is currently providing front line infantry in the dodgy bits of Afghanistan
itchyfidget urged me to go ahead and say what I had to say anyway. So here it is.In which I argue that NATO's bid to control southern Afghanistan is doomed to failure and that even if military control were to be established it would not result in the outcomes for which NATO is allegedly fighting.
Afghanistan has been invaded umpteen times. The earliest invader I can think of was Alexander the Great (Kandahar anyone). The British at the height of their Imperial power tried it a couple of times, the Soviet Union had a go. Now, NATO. It's not, technically an invasion since (as with the USSR) the 'invaders' are backing the Kabul 'government' but if it walks like a duck...
None of these invaders established a lasting presence for their home governments or their proxies. None of them established a government in Kabul that could actually control the local chiefs who really rule a country of considerable ethnic complexity and horribly difficult terrain. The best that anyone has ever managed is the same solution that the Government of India, before 1948, and Pakistan since have applied in the not dissimilar North West Frontier Provinces; a mixture of (more or less) benign neglect, bribery and terror raids when the locals overstep the mutually understood limits.
In Afghanistan, where British and Canadian soldiers (and of course Afghans) are dying every day, we are told that NATO is promoting democracy and stable government and preventing Afghanistan becoming a failed narcostate. Laudable aims indeed but strategy is not about wishful thinking it's about matching means and ends; achievable ends and available resources. I submit that history and common sense alike argue that extending the control of an unpopular Kabul government over the Pashtun speaking provinces of the south is simply not an achievable aim, even if NATO was prepared to commit the size of force and take the level of casualties that the USSR did, which it isn't.
Look at key features of the situation in, for example Helmand. NATO claims to be fighting the Taleban but the regrettable fact is that they, like previous invaders, are fighting the entire male population of military age.[1] I don't think this implies hard line support for the ideas of the Taleban. It's the natural reaction of a close knit society to invasion. Do you think every Briton in 1940 supported Churchill's union busting? Of course not! Half the population hated his guts but they hated the idea of being conquered by Germany even more. The reaction of the population of the Soviet Union after the German invasion is even more striking. Let's get real. Most people do not like foreign armies telling them what to think and what to do. If they have the means to resist they likely will. If they are armed to the teeth, live in some of the most easily defensible terrain in the world and have a centuries long track record of doing so successfully they are likely to be even more motivated to do so.
The Pashtuns have some other pretty significant advantages. They border on the frontier provinces of Pakistan which, as pointed out above, have never been fully under the control of the government in Simla or in Islamabad. The border is exceedingly porous and allows men and materiel to move back and forth as easily as the terrain allows. In the absence of Pakistani interdiction, the Pashtun can establish rear bases and supply lines beyond reach of the NATO forces. This is hardly a secret as it's exactly how the CIA routed support to the Taleban in earlier days. The security of those LoCs is further reinforced by the politics of the Pakistani military. Pakistan may be a military dictatorship but the one major area of society that Musharraf doesn't really control is the army. The army is riddled with factions and certain crucial parts of it (the Intelligence and Security service for example) are active supporters of the Taleban. Politically, however, the Americans are committed to Musharraf so this (and Pakistani support for terror in Kashmir and elsewhere) must, officially, remain the elephant in the room.
Set against such advantages NATO has only technology. It's other disadvantages are rather substantial. The biggest, of course, is that no NATO power will commit men and money in the quantities necessary to have, literally, a fighting chance. All the NATO powers that are fit to fight (a rather small proportion of the whole) are either overcommitted elsewhere, too small or too sensible[1] to put a serious field force in Afghanistan. Modern armies have surprisingly few actual combat troops[2] and British politicians in particular love to promise troops they don't have for high profile international adventures. As a result, the NATO troops on the ground in Afghanistan are woefully few.
The second crippling disadvantage is that the electorate in the NATO countries are very intolerant of casualties. No Viceroy of India ever had to worry that The Times would run a front page story on the deaths of three infantrymen but that is the problem that NATO governments face today. The front pages of the major Canadian dailies carry "Death in Afghanistan" stories almost every day. Both British and Canadian governments will face the electorate within a maximum of about eighteen months. The public will not support years of the boys coming home in wooden boxes.
That leaves technology. Clearly technology gives NATO a significant advantage but though Strykers and A-10s are a significant step up from AK-47s and RPGs, so were mountain artillery and rockets versus matchlocks, or RAF bombers versus bolt action rifles. Technology allows NATO to minimise casualties and to inflict death and destruction. It won't provide victory because one doesn't win an infantry war until your guys can walk across the ground and flush the other guys out of their hole at bayonet point. Technology can't do that and there aren't (and never will be) enough troops on the ground to do it the old fashioned way.
And what if, by some miracle, the southern tribes decided to stop fighting? Would that permit the development of an autonomous civil society, the rule of law, free and fair elections and the eradication of the opium poppy? It's inconceivable. Look at those parts of Afghanistan where the government's writ more or less runs. They are run in the traditional way. The Karzai government contents itself with skimming off western aid money while appointing bandits loyal to it to governorships and senior security positions. Those bandits operate the same devil's deal with the locals that local strong men always have. In return for deference, tribute and military support when needed they will provide defence from outsiders (including the central government) and rudimentary enforcement of traditional ideas of justice. That's how it's been for centuries. One day it may change but that will be when the Afghans want change not when NATO or some other bunch of foreigners tells them to.
fn1 Interestingly, the Americans when they were fighting in the south largely avoided this mistake. They gave it out for public consumption that they were fighting Al Quaeda and the Taleban but, in practice, left the Taleban alone. Unsurprisingly, in a society where someone from the next valley is considered a foreigner, Al Quaeda's motley band of Arabs, Chechens and Pakistanis garnered a good deal less local support.
fn2 Besides the USA, Britain, France and Germany have relatively large, well trained and equipped armed forces. One or two of the smaller countries like Norway and Canada have small but well trained forces. The rest range from ex Warsaw pact relics through the frankly useless (like the Danes) to the large but dubious Turkish Forces. In practice, Germany does not commit forces to overseas combat missions and France does so only for entirely French reasons.
fn3 The British Army has forty understrength infantry battalions (forty-three if one factors in the RMLI and special forces). When the need to bring a deployed battalion up to strength is factored in, that amounts to no more than thirty five. What politicians are reluctant to recognise (and generals too timid to point out forcefully enough) only about 20% of that force can be deployed for combat missions at any one time. More, and the strain of continued unaccompanied tours, hits reenlistment and recruiting so badly that the force shrinks still further. In other words, the British can deploy maybe seven battalions long term in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. That's 5000 deployable infantry at anyone time. That's barely enough for Iraq. In other words, the troops for Afghanistan are only being made available by exceeding long term sustainable deployment levels which explains why only 700 or so infantry are available for the whole of Helmand province. Realistically the much smaller Canadian army can only add another 1000 or so, despite having no other major commitments. Nobody else is currently providing front line infantry in the dodgy bits of Afghanistan
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Interestingly...
Date: 2006-09-07 01:55 pm (UTC)Re: Interestingly...
Date: 2006-09-07 02:00 pm (UTC)Re: Interestingly...
Date: 2006-09-07 02:08 pm (UTC)Re: Interestingly...
Date: 2006-09-07 02:18 pm (UTC)Oh I do agree! It's highly unlikely that the USA would retain anything like the cohesion of Afghan society.
Re: Interestingly...
Date: 2006-09-07 02:39 pm (UTC)Getting mixed up in Afghanistan is like invading Russia in the winter months... A Very Bad Idea.
Re: Interestingly...
Date: 2006-09-07 02:49 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:00 pm (UTC)Tell me how you would respond to claims that Afghanistan as a failed state is not a breeding ground for terrorists, but simply a human tragedy that we have a moral obligation to try to obviate.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:11 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:16 pm (UTC)I don't think your analogy is apt; Blair and Harper are elected democratic leaders (of a sort), and they're being the civilian commanders of militaries. Their status as non-combatants seems only somewhat relevant to me.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:27 pm (UTC)I guess one could read it that way but in the absence of a viable alternative that may be the least immoral option. The world is full of states that mistreat their inhabitants or their neighbours but that doesn't mean we should invade them all. China for instance? Surely you jest!
I'm not sure that you are advancing a position but the one that seems to lurk under the surface is awfully close to the old notion of the "white man's burden", that somehow the 'civilzed' world has an obligation to 'rescue' the less civilized from their depravity. It has a poor track record.
I'll stick with the analogy and broaden it to "Do I (or an elected civilian leader) have the right to make futile gestures that cost other people's lives because they make me glow inside in a warm moral way?"
no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:34 pm (UTC)Surely, there is a huge amount of colonialism to international aid charity. (And, to be clear, what I'd probably start to feel good about would be if it were safe for folks from MCC or the like were able to start building schools without fearing for their lives.) I mean, there's a huge amount of cultural snobbery to almost all kinds of charity, except the kind that is intra-class (like giving money to opera houses).
So yes, you can certainly cast it in Kiplingesque terms, but it's also the reaction I have had when travelling in not-especially-lousy places; the worst poverty I've ever seen was in Romania and in western Russia. I can't imagine my reaction to a place like southern Africa or central Asia wouldn't be to try to figure out how to make things better.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:46 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:58 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:36 pm (UTC)I realize that the military is the place where it's most obvious, but slews of government projects have the same sorts of effects, just not always directly.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:53 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:56 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:59 pm (UTC)Well I agree with the last bit! But, seriously, how are they supposed to make informed judgements when the politicians are lying to them so consistently? Just take the issue, hinted at by me, of overstretch. The politicians are saying there is none, usually in weasel words like "I am unaware of any formal request for more resources". Of course not, any request from the field won't make it to a minister because, informally, everyone knows that the person who makes it will be sacked or have their career prospects blighted. And when generals are making public statements like "The army is only just not overstretched" you know damn well that it is very overstretched indeed. Most people have no idea how to sort through that kind of obfuscation and so the politicians get away with it.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 06:32 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 06:48 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 06:56 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 03:13 am (UTC)That would be a valid charge if the Afghans thought of their set-up as a sewer, and wanted out. And were asking for help.
As far as I know, the Afghans are, and have long been,quite pleased with the way they live their lives. Until that changes, and that is possible when the impetus for change comes from them, anything else is just going to be an annoyance foisted by meddling outsiders.
I have often wondered if they would have chosen to go on living that way had they not been the playground of bigger powers for centuries at end. One needs to experience stability, to get used to it and its benefits, before one starts longing for it and then working for it. And I can't recall any time in the last 5 centuries when Afghanistan enjoyed any degree of stability. The closest thing to stability that I can think of is the century or so during the rise of the Mughal Empire in India. Since the Timurids were considered to have some sort of a right over the area, the populace didn't quite rebel against the Mughals. But it was only the outpost of the Empire, and the governors changed frequently, and it was stable only to the extent of the lack of major rebellions. And it was a bit too long ago to figure heavily on public consciousness.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 03:19 am (UTC)It was very helpful to recently read A concise history of Australia, which also made the point you just made, quite forcefully: that the aboriginal population there really was doing just fine, thankyouverymuch.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 03:34 am (UTC)Y'see, everyone adapts**, and I think it helps to have relatively sane adapters within the community, right then and there. That is how political movements for change are born.
* - I am not especially sane but am really incredibly sane when compared to many people.
** - See below for the way the warlords adapted to urban living in Kabul.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 10:36 am (UTC)[Of course, I myself am also an immigrant, but of a much more mild sort.]
no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 01:03 pm (UTC)I was merely explaining my position, as it pertains to me and me alone, and my reasoning for the same. :)
no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 02:05 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 02:12 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 02:23 pm (UTC)I can definitely see the US changing to a country that I'd be willing to live in. But the primary means by which I can see it change to the country I'd rather live in mostly would involve changes here.
no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:50 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 02:53 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-07 03:35 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2006-09-08 03:24 am (UTC)I didn't get any more details but the picture wasn't pretty. And it certainly didn't suggest that democracy was either taking root, or that a fertile ground was being prepared to receive the seeds of democracy. Nothing I have read in the media since then has changed that picture.
Narcotic production is at all time high, but everything else in Afghanistan seems to be roughly about the way it has been for centuries. And I can't help but wonder if old Brit Afghan hands are tearing their hair out in frustration at the fact that they are in middle of Afghanistan *yet again*...