Why is religious belief privileged?

[chickenfeet]

I find the debates over the wearing of veils interesting. Generally speaking I think that if someone wants to wear a veil they should. Not because it's part of their religion but because I can't think of a good reason why they shouldn't. I note though that the debate is couched almost entirely in religious terms. That prompts me to ask the question why religious beliefs should be held to justify behaviour that would be be banned or discouraged if indulged in because of other beliefs, however deeply held. For example, why should a committed nudist not be permitted to meet Mr. Jack Straw or attend a lecture at Imperial College in a state of undress? They certainly couldn't be held to be a security risk! It might be argued that nudity offends some people but that, of course, is precisely the argument used against veils.

Comments

[liadnan]

I'm too tired to comment properly and in any event have no particularly coherent thoughts on the point, but I went looking for the ECtHR case on the Turkish headscarves/education case earlier, so have the link to do with as you will:
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?skin=hudoc-en&action=html&table=1132746FF1FE2A468ACCBCD1763D4D8149&key=11423
(That should work, the ECtHR searchable database is incredibly irritating about providing stable sensible permanent links). Some interesting points, particularly in the dissent at the end.

"Religious freedom" is singled out in the EConv.HR and, if I recollect correctly, the Universal Declaration (and various constitutions and the like). The question is, what is "religion" or religious belief for these purposes: in the Turkish case it was observed that the right has been of use to atheists.

[chickenfeet2003.livejournal.com]

I found the dissenting judgement much more cogent and compelling than the majority opinion. The majority seemed to be taking a 'spectre at the feast' line. No evidence that a woman wearing a headscarf actually posed a threat to anybody was produced, merely the argument that someone might feel threatened. It seems to me that the 'someone might feel threatened' line of reasoning could be used against the exercise of just about any freedom.