Book review
Jan. 12th, 2008 10:02 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
chickenfeetJC Masterson, The Double Cross System
Masterson was an Oxford academic who spent the war working for B1A branch of MI5; the organisation which ran double agents in Britain. His book was written as an internal appreciation of the system at the end of the european war and only published in 1972. It's a good read and quite fascinating. The essence of the story is that within weeks of the outbreak of war the entire German espionage network in Britain had been broken and its members either 'turned' or executed. From then on the german network was managed by B1A for the dual purposes of counter-espionage (what more effective way of stopping an enemy from developing an espionage capability than by convincing him he already has one?) and deception. Deception operations included persuading the Germans that anti U-boat minefields existed where none did, screwing up the targetting of V1s and V2s and supporting the pre D-Day deception that the fictitious FUSAG was going to deliver the main invasion in the Pas de Calais.
Incidental bits that I found interesting included the German plan to incite and arm a Welsh Nationalist insurrection and the great interest shown in the defences of Pearl Harbour during 1941. Information on the latter was passed to the Americans.
Masterson's conclusions seem hard to fault. In peacetime, espionage is easy and of great value while counter espionage is extremely difficult. In wartime the opposite is true.
Masterson was an Oxford academic who spent the war working for B1A branch of MI5; the organisation which ran double agents in Britain. His book was written as an internal appreciation of the system at the end of the european war and only published in 1972. It's a good read and quite fascinating. The essence of the story is that within weeks of the outbreak of war the entire German espionage network in Britain had been broken and its members either 'turned' or executed. From then on the german network was managed by B1A for the dual purposes of counter-espionage (what more effective way of stopping an enemy from developing an espionage capability than by convincing him he already has one?) and deception. Deception operations included persuading the Germans that anti U-boat minefields existed where none did, screwing up the targetting of V1s and V2s and supporting the pre D-Day deception that the fictitious FUSAG was going to deliver the main invasion in the Pas de Calais.
Incidental bits that I found interesting included the German plan to incite and arm a Welsh Nationalist insurrection and the great interest shown in the defences of Pearl Harbour during 1941. Information on the latter was passed to the Americans.
Masterson's conclusions seem hard to fault. In peacetime, espionage is easy and of great value while counter espionage is extremely difficult. In wartime the opposite is true.
